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THE SEALED ADOPTION 
RECORDS CONTROVERSY: 
BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS 
OF SECRECY 
Jason Kuhns· 
"Secrets are powerful. They are powerful produc-
ers of curiosity, action, guilt, rumor, and panic. 
They cause people to feel worthless. They demean 
and shame people. They haunt people and they 
obsess people. The impact of secrets is jolting and 
far-reaching. "I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When a child is adopted in the United States, the adoptee's 
original birth certificate and the records from the adoption pro-
ceedings are placed under seal,2 States issue new birth certifi-
cates pronouncing the adoptee as born to the adoptive parents.s 
Nearly. every state has enacted legislation to permanently seal 
these records;" thus, even adult adoptees do not have an abso-
lute right to access them. II This process has created a clash be-
tween adult adoptees who desire access to these original records 
identifying their biological parents and the states' policy of se-
crecy. States have made some progress in this "sealed records" 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
1. CYNTHIA D. MARTIN, BEATING THE ADOPTION GAME 226 (1988). 
2. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10,434 (West 1994). 
3. See, e.g., id. § 10,433. 
4. Alaska and Kansas currently allow adoptees access to their original birth certifi-
cates upon reaching majority. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65-2423 (1992). 
5. Although these states permanently seal the adoptee's original birth certificate and 
the records from the adoption proceedings, statutory provisions exist for opening these 
records upon court order. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
259 
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controversy by amending their statutes to reflect changing social 
mores.s However, to keep pace with societal needs, states must 
go further in allowing adult adoptees easier access to their origi-
nal birth records. 
This article will discuss the statutory history of adoption in 
the United States and advocate why a present day understand-
ing of the interests of the parties to the adoption process re-
quires that adoptees have greater access to these records. The 
author will examine the reasons why current statutory ap-
'proaches do not adequately address adoptees' needs and recom-
mend a procedural device that would sufficiently balance the in-
terests of the parties to this controversy. 
II. THE HISTORY OF SEALED RECORDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
English common law did not recognize the practice of adop-
tion.7 Thus, in the United States adoption law is entirely a crea-
tion of statute.S In 1851 the Massachusetts Legislature passed 
the first general adoption law.9 From the beginning, American 
adoption law protected the "best interests of the child."lo The 
first statutes did not bar access to court records,11 for adoption 
6. See infra notes 29·47 and accompanying text. 
7. Adoption was not introduced into common law because the concept conflicted 
with the principles of inheritance. The English held the belief that land should only be 
inherited by blood relatives. See Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and 
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 745·46 (1956); James R. Carter, Comment, Confidentiality 
of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 817·18 (1978). 
8. Because United States law has its roots in English common law which does not 
provide for adoption, adoption law had to be created by statute. "In the absence of com· 
mon law precedent, American jurisdictions did not develop the concept of adoption juris· 
prudentially but deferred to legislative authority." Carter, supra note 7, at 818. See also 
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 
1977). 
9. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324. See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of 
the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 465 (1971). 
10. The attention to the needs of the parentless child was a break from the tradi· 
tional focus on the childless parent. Historically, children were recognized only as prop· 
erty or 'chattel' of their parents or as wards of the state. Ruth·Arlene W. Howe, Adop-
tion Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958·1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1983). See also Nancy 
Sparks, Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Laws-Constitutional Violation or a 
Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575, 577·78 (1982) (stating that before the 
statutory law, the primary purpose of adoption was to provide the adopting parents with 
an heir). 
11. See Joan H. Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences, 
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proceedings were generally informal, and confidentiality was not 
a significant issue.12 
The New York law of 1916 was among the first statutes to 
provide for confidentiality by mandating that illegitimacy not 
appear in the transcript of the judicial proceedings. IS This stat-
ute "barred all persons from inspecting the files and records of 
an adoption except for the parties to the adoption."u Thus, con-
fidentiality merely concealed the adoption proceedings from the 
public, not from the actual participants. 
Institutionalized secrecy was introduced into American 
adoption in 1917 with Minnesota's enactment of the nation's 
first sealed records law closing adoption files from inspection by 
adult adoptees, their birth parents, and the general public.111 
Other states were slow to follow Minnesota's lead, but in 1938, 
the Child Welfare League of America began promoting secrecy 
in adoption as official policy.16 By the end of the 1940's, most 
states had followed suit.17 These "sealed records" laws pur-
ported to erase the stigma of illegitimacy by ensuring equal sta-
tus and treatment of adopted and non-adopted offspring. IS 
States began to view the adoptee as "reborn" to a new family 
and possessing a new identity.19 States sealed the original birth 
certificate and replaced it with an amended one.20 
Beyond the purpose of protecting the welfare of the 
adoptee, the state legislatures intended the statutes to foster 
productive relationships between adoptees and adoptive parents 
without the threat of interference from the biological parents.21 
ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE, 13-1, 13-5 n.6 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1991). 
12. Id. at 13-4 to 13-5. 
13. 1916 N.Y. Laws ch. 453, § 113. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-5. 
14.Id. 
15. 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, p.337. See HAL AIGNER, ADOPTION IN AMERICA COMING 
OF AGE 8 (1992); Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-5. 
16. AIGNER, supra note IS, at 8. 
17. Id. 
18. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL .• THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 37 (1978) (stating that 
adoption experts felt the adoptee should not be held responsible for the sins of the 
parent). 
19. Id. at 38. 
20.Id. 
21. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 781 (1976). 
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Further, states believed confidentiality afforded the biological 
mother a chance to rebuild her life with the assurance that the 
ordeal would not become public knowledge.22 
Secrecy has continued to pervade the adoption process, but 
during the 1970's adoptees organized23 and began to assert a 
"right to know" the truth about their origins.24 In response to 
these challenges, state legislatures again began amending their 
statutes to recognize the concerns of adoptees.211 These amend-
ments generally allow adoptees access to their original birth 
records under special circumstances which are defined as "good 
cause."26 Additional amendments provide for the release of iden-
tifying information to adoptees if the birth parents file their 
consent with a registry.27 
III. CURRENT STATUTORY APPROACHES 
No statute in the United States allows adoptees unlimited 
access to the records of their adoption proceedings. However, 
there are currently two states which allow adoptees of legal ma-
jority access to their original birth certificates which disclose the 
identity of their biological parents.28 Most states have enacted 
22. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 649; Sparks, supra note 10, at 578. 
23. In 1972, Florence Fisher founded the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association, 
now the ALMA Society. Since that time, the number of searchers has increased dramati-
cally, and orthodox American adoption has been held to account for its philosophy and 
procedures for the first time in its history. HAL AIGNER, FAINT TRAILS: A GUIDE To ADULT 
ADOPTEE-BIRTH PARENT REUNIFICATION SEARCHES 7 (1986). Aigner states that searching 
took root as a movement with the founding by adoptee Jean Paton of the country's first 
search self-help organization, Orphan Voyage, in 1953. Aigner suggests that public recog-
nition was slow to gather possibly due to the Civil Rights Movement, the resurgence of 
political feminism, the Vietnam protests, and other causes of the ensuing time, compet-
ing more urgently for public attention. [d. 
24. Adoptees argue that they have a constitutional right to their original birth 
records. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text. Furthermore, many adoptees feel 
a compelling psychological need to know the identity of their birth parents. See infra 
notes 88-105 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes. 
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 33 for a 
list of factors which are balanced to determine if "good cause" exists. 
27. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 9203,9204 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 229.40, 229.50); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138-d (McKinney Supp. 
1993). 
28. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1992). These states 
allow adult adoptees to obtain their original birth certificates upon request without the 
necessity of a judicial or administrative hearing. The original birth certificate provides an 
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provisions allowing adoptees access to non-identifying informa-
tion.29 These states now require agencies or private in-
termediaries to complete comprehensive profiles of adoptees and 
their biological parents at the time of adoption placement. so Al-
though nearly every state gathers and shares background infor-
mation available at the time of adoption, state policies still vary 
considerably regarding the maintenance and disclosure of such 
non-identifying information subsequent to placement.sl While 
non-identifying information is more accessible today, states con-
tinue to prohibit disclosure of identifying information except 
under special circumstances.32 
A. THE "GOOD CAUSE" STATUTES 
Most states which permanently seal adoption records pro-
vide for the release of information identifying biological parents 
upon a judicial finding of "good cause."SS This burden is easiest 
to establish if documented medical or psychiatric needs exist 
and the adoptee cannot obtain the information elsewhere. S4 A 
adoptee with the identities of his or her birth parents. 
29. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-12 to 13-13. Non-identifying information 
generally consists of the date and place of the adoptee's birth; the age of the biological 
parents at the time of placement and a description of their general physical appearance; 
the race, ethnicity and religion of the biological parents; the medical history of the bio-
logical parents and adoptee; whether the termination was voluntary or court-ordered; the 
facts and circumstances relating to the adoptive placement; the age and sex of any other 
children of the biological parents at the time of adoption; the educational levels of the 
birth parents, their occupations, interests, skills, etc.; and any supplemental information 
about the medical or social conditions of members of the biological family provided since 
the adoption was complete. Id. at 13-13 to 13-14. 
30. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 and § 45a-748 (West 1993) (stating 
that the agency must provide certain information, if known, about the biological parents 
to the adoptive parents and mandating the exercise of a reasonable effort by the agency 
to obtain such information as a precondition to the granting of a decree of adoption). 
31. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-14. 
32. Id. at 13-20 to 13-21. 
33. Id. at 13-21. In determining whether good cause for the release of identifying 
information exists, courts uniformly balance the following competing interests: 1) the 
nature of the circumstances dictating the need for release of the identity of the parents; 
2) the circumstances and desires of the adoptive parents; 3) the circumstances of the 
biological parents and the desire of at least the birth mother; and 4) the interest of the 
state in maintaining a viable system of adoption by the assurance of confidentiality. In 
re George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Mo. App. 1981); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1385 
(R.1. 1986). 
34. See, e.g., ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 995 (1979) (acknowledging that an appropriate showing of psychological 
trauma, medical need, or of a religious identity crisis would require the New York courts 
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few courts have allowed adoptees to contact their biological par-
ents in the hope of obtaining more accurate and up-to-date med-
ical information,811 but the mere desire of adoptees for data 
about potential susceptibility is most often found insufficient to 
justify releasing names of biological parents.88 Courts will occa-
sionally allow disclosure of adoption records to adult adoptees 
who offer proof of a serious psychological disorder stemming 
from an identity crisis.87 However, mere curiosity will not 
suffice.88 
B. MUTUAL CONSENT REGISTRIES 
In addition to a "good cause" statute, at least nineteen 
states have enacted some form of a mutual consent registry 
where parties to the adoption process can indicate their willing-
ness to meet.89 Both the biological parent and adult adoptee 
under their own statute to grant permission to release all or part ·of the sealed adoption 
records). 
35. See, e.g., In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981) (holding that an adult adoptee 
who feared she was at risk of developing uterine cancer because her biological mother 
might have taken DES while pregnant is entitled to inspect her adoption records). 
36. See, e.g., Golan v. Louise Wise Services, 514 N.Y.S.2d 682, 686 (1987). The court 
states: 
Id. 
[Als virtually any adopted person advances in age, his or her 
genetic history will be desirable for treatment of a variety of 
ailments including, for example, heart disease, diabetes and 
cancer. A rule which automatically gave full disclosure to any 
adopted person confronted with a medical problem with some 
genetic implications would swallow New York's strong policy 
against disclosure as soon as adopted people approached mid-
dle age. 
37. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. App. 1982) (psychological 
reasons may be sufficient to open sealed records); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1386 (se-
vere psychological need to know one's origins may present compelling circumstances that 
constitute good cause to permit adopted adults access to their birth records); Bradey v. 
Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981) (implying that adoptee might have 
shown good cause if he had required medical assistance for his feelings of insecurity or 
demonstrated that he was unable to maintain steady employment or a stable family life 
due to an identity crisis). 
38. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (holding a 
thinly supported claim of "psychological need to know" will not support a finding of 
good cause); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1389 (implying that mere curiosity does not 
amount to good cause). 
39. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at app. 13-A (Supp. 1992) for a complete list of 
these states. "Typically, biological parents are given the chance to manifest their consent 
to the release of identifying information, either at the time of the adoption, or later upon 
their own initiative." Melissa Arndt, Comment, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption 
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must file a formal consent to the mutual disclosure of their iden-
tities; otherwise no identifying information is released.40 Once a 
"match" occurs, a state administrat~r or private adoption 
agency will release the identifying information to the consenting 
parties.41 
These statutes are considered passive in nature because the 
states typically prohibit those involved with the registry from 
assisting either the biological parent or the adoptee in actively 
searching for each other.42 The mutual consent registries are 
designed as a short cut to waive the good cause requirement 
when both parties consent.43 Thus, where a biological parent's 
consent is not on file, the mutual consent states force the 
adoptee to challenge confidentiality by meeting the state's "good 
cause" standard.·· 
C. "SEARCH AND CONSENT" PROCEDURES 
At least seventeen states have amended their statutes to 
more actively facilitate the exchange of information between 
adoptees and biological parents than occurs with passive mutual 
consent registries.46 These "search and consent" laws authorize 
public or private agencies to assist adult adoptees in locating bi-
ological parents to ascertain whether they are willing to disclose 
their identities or actually meet with their adoptee}e Where the 
biological parents refuse consent, these states will not release 
identifying information unless the adoptee can establish "good 
Records Controversy, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 103, 121 (1986). Adult adoptees are allowed to 
manifest in writing their consent to release of identifying information about themselves. 
Consent can be revoked by either party at any time. [d. 
40. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 9203 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 229.40). 
41. See, e.g., id. § 9204 (replacing § 229.50); N.V PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138-
d (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
42. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 9204 (West Ann. 1993) (replacing § 229.50); N.V 
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4138-c, 4138-d (McKinney Supp. 1993) ("Any employee of the de-
partment or any employee of an authorized agency who solicits or causes another to 
solicit a registation ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... "). 
43. Hollinger. supra note 11, at 13-41. 
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1993). 
45. See Hollinger, supra note 11, at app. 13-A (Supp. 1992) for a complete list of 
these states. 
46. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1993); ALA. CODE § 26-
10A-31(j) (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-304 (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 
(West Supp. 1993). 
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cause."·7 
Neither the "good cause" nor the "mutual consent" varia-
tions of statutory change have satisfied adoptees in their quest 
for information about their backgrounds, for today adoptees 
challenge these statutes more adamantly than ever.48 Adoptee 
activists demand legislative reform, for they feel that these stat-
utes do not adequately address their psychological needs or their 
constitutional rights. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Adoptees argue that the sealed records statutes are uncon-
stitutiona1.49 They contend that denying them access to these 
records abridges their constitutional rights to privacy, to receive 
important information, and to equal protection of the law. &0 
They base the right to privacy argument on Supreme Court 
cases which recognize a right to privacy emanating from the pe-
numbra of express guarantees of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments which apply to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. &1 Adoptees specifically argue that, because 
47. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 19-8-23 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433 (West Supp. 
1993). 
48. "[TJhe roster of search self-help organizations throughout the 
country carries more than 200 entries with names such as 
Adoptees as Adults, Adoptees in Search, Concerned United 
Birthparents, Lost and Found, Truth Seekers in Adoption, 
and Yesterday's Children. A handful have chapters in more 
than one state. . . . Many are joined in loose affiliation under 
the umbrella of the American Adoption Congress. New groups 
regularly form; a few dissolve sporadically." AIGNER (Faint 
Trails), supra note 23, at 8. 
49. See, e.g., ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 995 (1979); Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1978); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981); In re Maples, 
563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). 
50. See, e.g., Yesterday's Children, 569 F.2d 431; Mills, 372 A.2d 646; In re Roger 
B., 418 N.E.2d 751; Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d 1225. Adoptees 
have based a fourth constitutional argument on the Thirteenth Amendment which pro-
hibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Adoptees argue that this prohibition extends to 
"badges or incidents" of slavery, and severing the parental-child relationship is one of 
the incidents the framers of the amendment intended to address. Id. at 1236-37. 
51. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Roe expressed the right 
of privacy as a "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life [in-
8
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
protection to an individual's right to privacy within family rela-
tionships,62 it must also protect an individual's right to know his 
or her true identity.1I3 Thus, adoptees contend that they have a 
fundamental right to know the identities of their biological par-
ents, for such information is necessary to achieve their own iden-
tity development. II. 
Adoptees also rely on the First Amendment right to receive 
information as a challenge to the sealed records statutes.1I1I They 
assert that denying them access to their original birth records 
interferes with their right of freedom to participate in and con-
tribute to social and governmental decision-making processes. liS 
To develop into integrated, healthy people capable of intelligent 
participation, adoptees argue that they need access to informa-
tion that will contribute to their self-fulfillment.1I7 Because the 
information adoptees desire will enhance their sense of identity 
and therefore their ability to participate intelligently, adoptees 
eluding] the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or 
beget a child." Id. at 169-70. 
52. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (right of privacy ineludes married couples' 
use of contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (unmarried per-
son has a right to use contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (woman has a right to 
terminate her pregnancy). See also Cythia A. Rucker, Texas Adoption Laws and 
Adoptees' Right of Access to Confidential Records, 15 ST. MARY's L. J. 153, 162 n.42 
(1983) (listing various other Supreme Court decisions which have recognized areas within 
the family relationship that are protected by the right of privacy). 
53. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 650; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762; ALMA Society, 601 
F.2d at 1231; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 753. 
54. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1231; Mills, 372 A.2d at 650. Because of 
the necessary interrelationship between the individuals' identity and their fundamental 
decision-making, adoptees argue that the right to privacy must also protect the individu-
als' control over the development of identity. "II]t is difficult ... to separate a person's 
identity from his choices in fundamental relationships. The core of his identity is indeed 
more private than his role as a parent or as a sexual partner, and any interference with 
its development necessarily affects his private decisions." Carolyn Burke, Note, The 
Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Rights to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 
1208 (1975). 
55. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 
752. 
56. 'Kathryn J. Giddings, The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to 
Know the Identity of their Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U. L. Q. 677, 689 (1980); Burke, 
supra note 54, at 1204-05. "To the extent it is true that only people who have developed 
fully and healthily are capable of intelligent decisionmaking, the protection of the First 
Amendment would seem to extend to information which affects that development, even 
though unrelated to any particular societal decision." Id. at 1205. 
57. Burke, supra note 54, at 1205. 
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maintain that the right to receive information must protect their 
access to their original birth records. liS 
The equal protection argument arises from the fact that 
non-adoptees can readily access their birth records. lIo Adoptees 
argue that the adopted status shares the same burdensome char-
acteristics that have made illegitimacy a "quasi-suspect class";6o 
thus, legislation which discriminates against them should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny.61 Adoptees assert that the sealed 
records statutes would fail a heightened scrutiny test because 
they do not advance an important or compelling state interest.611 
No federal or state court has accepted these constitutional 
challenges.6s Although recognizing that adoptees have a general 
right to privacy and to receive information, the courts have re-
jected the argument that adoptees have a fundamental right to 
learn the identities of their biological parents.64 The courts 
maintain that no constitutional or personal right is uncondi-
tional and absolute to the exclusion of the rights of all other 
58. 1d. at 1205-06. 
59. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563 
S.W.2d at 764. 
60. Leslie Allan, Confirming the Constitutionality 01 Sealing Adoption Records: 
ALMA Society v. Mellon, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 717, 731 (1980). Adoptees argue: 
1d. 
Because most adoptees are illegitimate, legislation differenti-
ating adoptees as a class should be given at least the same 
level of judicial scrutiny as that affecting illegitimates .... 
[T]he state treats adoptees less favorably than it treats illegit-
imates by denying adoptees the knowledge of their natural 
parents' identities; therefore, legislation affecting adoptees 
should be given more rigorous scrutiny than that given to leg-
islation which affects illegitimates. 
61. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563 
S.W.2d at 764. 
62. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233; Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 764; Roger B., 
418 N.E.2d at 756. 
62. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-44. 
64. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 650. "[W]hile information regarding the heritage, 
background and physical and psychological heredity of any person is essential to that 
person's identity and self-image, nevertheless it is not so intimately personal as to fall 
within the zones of privacy implicitly protected in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights." 
1d. See also Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233. The ALMA 
court refused to simply hold that because adoptees' interests in knowing the identities of 
their biological parents does not fall within the recognized categories of "privacy", it is 
not constitutionally protected. Rather, the court analyzed the asserted right in light of 
the social context in determining the right is not fundamental. 1d. at 1231-33. 
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.individuals.611 The right to privacy arid to information asserted 
by adoptees directly conflicts with the right to privacy of birth 
parents to be left alone.66 Due to these conflicting interests, the 
sealed records statutes are upheld because they bear a rational 
relationship to the permissible state objective of protecting the 
integrity of the adoption process.67 Although the adoptee may no 
longer need the state's protection upon reaching adulthood, 
courts state that the birth parents' interest in confidentiality 
may actually become stronger.66 
Courts have also rejected the equal protection argument.69 
Court.s state that the adopted status does not share the burden-
some characteristics that have made illegitimacy a quasi-suspect 
class;70 thus, classification based on the adopted status does not 
require intermediate or strict scrutiny.71 Even assuming that the 
adopted status classification was subject to intermediate review, 
courts maintain that the sealed records statutes would still not 
violate the equal protection clause because the statutes are sub-
stantially related to an important state interest.72 Moreover, 
65. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 652; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233. 
66. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1231; Mills, 372 A.2d at 651; Roger B., 418 
N.E.2d at 755-56. 
67. See, e.g., Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762-64; Mills, 372 A.2d at 651-52. The sealed 
records statutes represent the legislative judgment that confidentiality promotes the wel-
fare of all parties to the adoption relationship. Adoptees benefit from the removal of the 
illegitimacy stigma. Adoptive parents and birth parents benefit from the freedom of pos-
sible intrusion in the future. Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754-55. 
68. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 651 (stating that it is highly likely that the birth parent 
has established new relationships and chosen not to reveal the facts of such an emotional 
experience that occurred in the past). See also Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 755-56; ALMA 
Society, 601 F.2d at 1235-36. 
69. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653-54; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233-36; Roger 
B., 418 N.E.2d at 756-57. 
70. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 653. "An adoptee does not derive [the adopted status) 
from an accident of birth but as a result of a legal proceeding which has as the very 
essence of its purpose the protection of the adoptee's best interest." [d. See also ALMA 
Society, 601 F.2d at 1234 (stating that the distinguishing trait between adult adoptees 
and non-adopted illegitimates is not illegitimacy, but the adopted status). "Discrimina-
tion against illegitimates is generally so treated because of the illogic and injustice of 
stigmatizing a child in order to express disapproval of the parents' liasons .... If 
adopted persons experience social stigma, it is not as intense or pervasive as illegitimates 
suffer." [d. 
71. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1234; Roger B., 418 
N.E.2d at 756. 
72. ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1234; Mills, 372 A.2d at 653 ("The state has more 
than a rational basis, it has a compelling interest."). See supra notes 18-22 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the legislative purposes behind sealed records statutes. 
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courts note that the "good cause" provisions allowing for the re-
lease of adoption records substantially mitigates the possible 
overbreath of the statutes.7S 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the sealed records controversy, it is highly unlikely 
adoptees will ever establish a constitutional right of access to 
their birth records.7• Thus, the strongest possibility for further 
open access to birth records lies in legislative reform.711 Adoptees 
must persuade their state legislatures to reevaluate the interests 
involved in light of present day social mores. By forcing their 
respective legislatures to take a closer look at the sealed records 
controversy, adoptees can demonstrate that the need for state-
imposed secrecy no longer exists. 
V. CHANGING VIEWS ABOUT SECRECY 
The "sealed records" policy in adoption served adoptees, 
birth parents, and adoptive parents extremely well at a time 
when society was not generally well-accepting of out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies or single parent families.78 The public not only ac-
cepted the closure of records but demanded such a policy.77 So-
ciety has changed a great deal since sealed records first became 
widely accepted as the perfect solution to a complex problem.78 
73. See, e.g., ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1236; Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 757. 
74. See, e.g., Allan, supra note 60, at 726; Michael J. Hanley, A Reasonable Ap-
proach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, 2 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 542, 549-50 
(1975). 
75. See, e.g., Handley, supra note 74, at 552; Carter, supra note 7, at 852·53. 
76. See, e.g., Task Force on Confidentiality in the Adoption Program, A REPORT TO 
THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH. July, 1977, at 1; ELINOR B. ROSENBERG. THE 
ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE 1-2 (1992). Rosenberg states: 
[d. 
[A]doption of children was commonly thought to be the per-
fect solution to a myriad of problems: birth parents who chose 
to continue a pregnancy but could not raise their child could 
expect the child to be well cared for and supported; infertile 
couples who longed for a child were able to fulfill their wishes 
for a family; fertile couples who chose to enlarge their families 
while meeting a social need could do so; children who needed 
parents were provided with a welcome home; and child welfare 
agents in the legal, social, and medical systems were able to 
offer a solution that, for once, was opposed by no one. 
77. REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 76. at 1. 
78. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 10. 
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The sexual revolution of the 1960's, changes in the social situa-
tion of women in relation to sex and parenthood, changing atti-
tudes about illegitimacy, the availability of contraceptives, and 
the legitimization of abortion have all contributed to changing 
views about the confidentiality of birth records.79 At the same 
time, some of the basic social and psychological beliefs that sup-
ported the "as if"80 quality of the adoption system began to 
change.81 These shifts have altered the concept of adoption as a 
perfect solution and raised many questions about existing adop-
tion practices.82 
Today, people who study adoption realize that while confi-
dentiality is in the best interests of adoptees as children, this 
does not always hold true for adoptees who have reached adult-
hood.83 Moreover, many biological and adoptive parents have vo-
calized that confidentiality is not in their best interests either.84 
Surely a few members of the adoption triad oppose disclosure; 
nevertheless, the interests of these participants must be bal-
anced against the overwhelming majority of members who 
strongly support openness. The interests of a small minority in 
secrecy should not impose secrecy on everyone else. 
A. THE ADOPTEES' BEST INTERESTS 
A common complaint of adult adoptees is that society con-
tinues to treat them as "children," and they are never allowed to 
grow Up.811 Adoption legislation forgets that what is in adoptees' 
79. See id.; John Triseliotis, Obtaining Birth Certificates, in ADOPTION 43, (Philip 
Bean ed. 1984). 
80. It was as if the birth mother had never borne the child, and as if the adoptive 
mother had. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 10. 
81. "One important shift was away from the belief in the predominance of nurture 
over nature as an influence on individual development .... New information about 
genetic structure and heredity shifted this view so that both nature and nurture were 
seen as influential, the balance different between each individual." Id. 
82. See id. at 11. 
83. See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text. 
84. See infra notes 112-130 and accompanying text. 
85. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 121. The authors mention how an adoption agency 
refused to release background information to a forty-year-old adoptee. The agency ad-
ministrator informed the woman that she would need to obtain permission from her sev-
enty-six-year-old adoptive mother. Id. at 122. The authors also quote an adoptee as 
saying: 
In a way, I am very angry at the law. The law still refers to me 
as a child when they refer to "in the best interests of the 
13
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best interests as children may no longer be so once they have 
reached adulthood.86 Adoptees argue that they no longer need 
the state's protection as adults, for they are quite capable of de-
ciding what is in their best interests.87 
The limited research88 on adult adoptees suggests that they 
often suffer from identity crises89 due to a lack of knowledge 
about their origins.90 The ignorance of their true genealogical 
child." I resent that because in my opinion, I am twenty-one 
years old and I feel I am quite old enough, mature and respon-
sible enough to be making my own decisions. I don't feel as if 
any decision concerning my life should be left up to a judge or 
anyone else. 
[d. at 121. 
86. See Patricia Gallagher Lupack, Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: the Need 
for Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAWYER 211, 217 (1975). 
87. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 146. The authors quote an adoptee as 
stating: 
[d. 
No one, no social worker ha[s) the right to decide for me what 
I should know about me. If I don't like what I find out, that's 
my problem. I'm an adult in every other way, and I make my 
own decisions about what risks I take, and I face the conse-
quences, too. 
88. Although much research exists on adoption, Betty Jean Lifton mentions that 
there has been very little research on adopted adults. She suggests that this lack of re-
search reflects society's difficulty in thinking of the adoptee who has reached adulthood. 
BETTY JEAN LIFTON, LOST & FOUND 63 (1988). Hal Aigner suggests that because secrecy 
has imposed limited access to adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents as study 
subjects, much of the research about the adoptive experience may be considered of dubi-
ous value at best. AIGNER (Coming of Age), supra note 15, at 19. 
89. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 14. The authors state that an adoptee: 
[I)gnorant of his/her true background, despite a healthy, nur-
turing relationship with his/her adoptive parents and a lack of 
severe problems in his/her relationships with peers and others, 
will be handicapped in the psychohistorical dimension of iden-
tity . . . . The psychohistorical dimension includes that part 
of man's identity that relates to his/her sense of genealogy, an 
existential concern that views man as going through a cycle of 
life stages which are connected to the previous and future gen-
erations through the phenomena of birth and death. 
[d. See generally Paul Sachdev, Unlocking the Adoption Files: A Social and Legal Di-
lemma, ADOPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 141, 142-46 (Sachdev, ed. 1984) (discuss-
ing various studies which indicate the identity problems which adoptees face). 
90. See, e.g., Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143. Sachdev states: 
While all children during their adolescence experience in vary-
ing degrees the problems of identity formation, adopted ado-
lescents are particularly vulnerable to interference with the 
development of their self-identity because of their sense of 
deprivation of "rootedness" and linkage with their biological 
past. 
14
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background causes many adoptees to feel a deeply-rooted psy-
chological need to learn the identities of their birth parents. Bl 
The fact that adoptees have two sets of parents can complicate 
the formation of their self-identities because this fact seems to 
set adoptees apart from the vast majority of people, including 
their adoptive family.B2 Thus, the search for origins can have a 
beneficial effect on adoptees' sense of identity.Bs Even when 
adoptees are disappointed by what they discover, they can still 
benefit from learning the truth.B4 
Evidence exists that adoptees make up a disproportionately 
high percentage of psychiatric patients in the United States.BII 
Some adoptees fear the possibility of incest with an unknown 
biological relative.Bs Many adoptees concern themselves with the 
hereditary and genetic aspects of illness, physical features, and 
life span. B7 They experience further frustration for not being 
able to pass this information on to their own children.Bs Some 
adult adoptees appear to suffer from low self-esteem and seem 
to be angry at the world which has withheld knowledge of their 
birthright from them.BB Adoptees have used this research as am-
[d. As identity formation is a life-long process, adoptees' need to know their origins con-
tinues into adulthood. Burke, supra note 54, at 1202. Betty Jean Lifton speaks of the 
adoptive adult as "the child now grown, although it is hard to know where one ends and 
the other begins." LIFTON, supra note 88, at 62. 
. 91. See JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS 154 (1973). 
92. Burke, supra note 54, at 1201. "In addition, the adoptee is totally deprived of 
that sense of what makes his family unique which would come simply from observing 
and talking with his natural parents." [d. 
93. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 54, at 1203; Sachdev, supra note 89, at 145; TRIBE-
LIOTIS, supra note 91, at 139. Triseliotis mentions various comments of adoptees after 
conducting searches including: "knowing where 1 stand", being "more at peace with my-
selr', "contented", "much happier", "having bridged the gap". [d. 
94. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 54, at 1203; TRISELIOTIB, supra note 91, at 140. 
95. See, e.g., SOROSKY supra note 18, at 96; ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 118. 
96. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 113; SOROSKY supra note 18, at 124. 
Sorosky et al. mention one case where a young man brought his fiancee home to meet his 
parents. Upon looking at the young woman and learning that she was adopted, the 
mother became immediately uncomfortable. "It didn't take too long for her to determine 
that this was the grown-up version of the child she had relinquished for adoption twenty 
years earlier." [d. 
97. [d. at 126. See also Jackie Weber, 'Who Am !?'-a Basic Right, L.A. TIMES, July 
7, 1990, at 7b. Weber, an adoptee, asks "WHO AM I? 1 still don't know. At 22, 1 don't 
know whose nose I have, my genealogy, my family medical history, why 1 weighed about 
as much as a cantaloupe at birth. These are gaping holes in my life." [d. 
98. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 128. 
99. [d. at 130. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 112. Rosenberg quotes an 
adoptee as wondering: 
15
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munition in their court petitions to show good cause for release 
of their birth records. loo However, courts have rarely enabled 
adoptees to open their records based on a thinly supported psy-
chological need. lol 
Ample evidence exists in the literature to suggest that 
adoptees' desire to know their biological roots is not an idle curi-
osity of individuals who are psychologically and socially im-
paired.l02 These writers contend that this psychological need is a 
nearly universal phenomenon in normal personality develop-
ment. lOS The adoptee's compelling need for his or her true iden-
tity is an undeniable basic human need to know one's true place 
in history.lo. The intensity of this desire no doubt varies with 
each individual; some adoptees may have an apparent disinter-
est in seeking knowledge about or contact with their biological 
parents; others may manifest their interest more 
compulsively. 1011 
Whether the need to search for one's origins is viewed as the 
result of psychological impairment or a normal curiosity about 
one's genealogy, the current literature on adoption demonstrates 
that the sealed records statutes are not in the best interests of 
many adult adoptees. loe Current state laws do not adequately 
address adoptees' need for information about their background. 
ld. 
Who am I? What do I present to the world out there as I ex-
plore intimate relationships and work? Am I really a college 
graduate prepared for a professional life like my adoptive par-
ents or have I just been groomed to look like one? Sometimes 
I feel like a total fraud and that I am really an auto mechanic 
dressed up to look like a lawyer. 
100. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
101. See supra note 38. 
102. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143. 
103. See Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143 (listing these authors). 
104. See, e.g., SOROSKY supra note 18, at 139 (citing Margaret Lawrence who had 
interviewed two hundred adult adoptees); Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143 (citing the 
same study). See a/so In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J., 
concurring) ("All of us need to know our past, not only for a sense of lineage and heri-
tage, but for a fundamental and crucial sense of our very selves: our identity is incom-
plete and our sense of self retarded without a real personal historical connection."). 
105. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 143-44 (citing Margaret Lawrence). See supra note 
104. 
106. Carolyn Burke suggests that whatever adoptees' reasons for searching out their 
identity, the fact that they attempt to do so despite the current legislation serves as 
testimony to the depth of their need to know. Burke, supra note 54, at 1202-03. 
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B. THE BIRTH PARENTS' INTERESTS 
The sealed records statutes purport to protect the birth par-
ents'lO'7 right of privacy.l08 State legislatures and courts base this 
view on the traditional assumption that birth parents want to 
sever all ties with their adoptee and forget about the entire ex-
perience.l09 Proponents of sealed birth records maintain that 
birth parents continue to rely on past assurances of anonymity 
to protect themselves against intrusions by the children they 
gave up for adoption.110 
State legislatures should reevaluate the traditional assump-
tions in light of the changed social context and studies which 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of these assumptions. III With the 
advent of activist organizations such as Concerned United 
Birthparents (CUB),112 birth parents are increasingly revealing 
107. The ensuing discussion of birth parents' interests occasionally refers specifi-
cally to birth mothers because they actually bore the adoptee. Moreover, the majority of 
the author's sources referred specifically to the experiences of birth mothers after giving 
up their adoptee. Nevertheless, this discussion applies to birth fathers as well. See, e.g., 
Dear Abby, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 1994, at E8. Abby prints the letter of a birth father who 
writes: 
Id. 
We are always reading about unwed mothers who give up their 
children for adoption. What about the fathers of these chil-
dren? I am the father of a baby boy born out of wedlock. I 
would give my right arm to have raised that child, but I had 
no say in the matter; he was given to strangers who adopted 
him. 
108. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1386 (R.I. 1986); Bradey v. 
Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981). 
109. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 651. 
110. See id. See also On the Confidentiality of Adoption Records, NATIONAL COM-
MITI'EE FOR ADOPTION 2 (on file with the National Committee for Adoption, Wash. D.C.). 
111. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 53 (reporting eighty-two percent of birth 
parents said they were interested in a reunion with adoptee); Adoption: A Life Long 
Process, REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES. 
March 1989, at 17. None of the 130 birth parents polled were adverse to a reunion with 
their adoptee. Five percent of the adoptees and two percent of the adoptive parents were 
adverse to a reunion. Id. See also REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH. 
supra note 76. at 32 (citing a study of the Children's Home Society of California which 
found that eighty-two percent of the 102 birth parents polled supported the right of 
adult adoptees to have access to their original birth certificates and that eighty-nine per-
cent of adoptees and seventy-three percent of adoptive parents supported this access as 
well).Id. 
112. CUB is a nonprofit organization that advocates the opening of adoption records 
to adoptees and recommends an acceptance of two sets of parents, similar to stepparent 
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that the sealed records statutes are not in their best interests 
either.ll8 
Birth parents express that the adoption agencies advised 
them to pretend the adoptee does not exist and assured them 
that they would forget the entire experience, but they never ac-
tually do.u" Many birth mothers experience emotional conflicts 
such as anger, grief, guilt, and depression as an aftermath of 
adoption. m Many wish they had never given up their child.118 
Others wish they could explain to the adoptee their reason for 
choosing adoption.117 
and foster home arrangements. CUB espouses a primary goal of avoiding unnecessary 
adoptions and keeping biological families together. ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 11. 
l13. See Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149. See generally SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 
47-72 (discussing the feelings of various birth parents). 
l14. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 58. The authors quote a birth mother as saying: 
1 was told 1 would forget-nonsense. That 1 would get over it; 
other children would help me forget this child. These empty 
promises and pat theories of social workers simply have no ba-
sis in reality, no basis in the feelings of natural mothers who 
have been through this devastating experience. 
Id. See also Leslie Dreyfous, Dead Ends, Red Tape Mark One Birth Mother's Search for 
Son, L.A. TIMES, November 29, 1992, at 1A ("I was told that I'd forget the experience, 
that I'd have other children and go on with life. What happened is I've never had other 
children, and I've never forgotten the experience."). 
l15. Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149. See also Mary McGrory, Adoption's Last 
Anguish, WASH. POST, July 8,1990, at C1 ("They tell you that you will put it all behind 
you and get on with your life. But it gnaws at you constantly. They do not prepare you 
for the pain. You are made to feel responsible to make some childless couple happy."); 
ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 168. Rosenberg states that some birth mothers say they 
accepted the idea that they would put the pain of the relinquishment behind them and 
go on with successful lives; instead, they have experienced a lifetime of grieving and 
regret. Id. 
l16. Many birth parents feel that had they been offered financial and emotional 
support, they would have been able to raise the child themselves. "They blame opinion-
ated social workers and families for forcing them into the belief that adoption was the 
best option for them and for their child." ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 168. 
l17. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 62. The authors quote a biological mother 
as saying: 
1 was a mother who gave up her rights, but not her feelings, 
about the daughter she gave up for adoption. 1 would like her 
to know that 1 didn't give her up because 1 didn't want her, or 
love her. 1 wanted her to have something 1 couldn't give her at 
the time that she needed it most. 
Id. The authors also mention a biological mother who says: 
1 gave up a male child for adoption thirteen years ago . . . . 1 
want to explain to him why he was given up for adoption and 
to help him to know that he was not rejected by me. 1 was 
raped and know little about the father; still 1 feel that my 
child has a right to know the truth. . 
18
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The traditional assumption was that opening birth records 
would subject many birth parents who are found by their 
adoptees to renewed fears of guilt or shame. However, for a ma-
jority of birth parents, the reunion experience provides an op-
portunity to resolve old feelings of guilt and erase years of ques-
tions about the fate of their relinquished child.u8 Even those 
birth parents who are originally adverse to a reunion with the 
adoptee often change their minds after being contacted, for they 
realize the healing effect from discarding the veil of secrecy.ll9 
There remain a few birth parents who undoubtedly want to 
retain their anonymity and would definitely not welcome a reun-
ion.120 For these parents, the reappearance of a child given up 
years before could be potentially disruptive or even devastating. 
However, the feelings of these birth parents must be weighed 
against the strong desire for openness held by searching 
adoptees and the overwhelming majority of birth parents. The 
current statutes allow the desire for secrecy held by a small mi-
nority to impose secrecy on everyone else. 
C. THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS' INTERESTS 
Sealed records protect the interests of adoptive parents 
from unwanted intrusion.121 Adoptive parents should be able to 
raise the adoptee without the fear of interference from the birth 
parents.122 Many adoptive parents fear that liberalization of the 
sealed records statutes could lead to the loss of their adoptive 
[d. at 63. 
118. See generally SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 157-96. 
119. See LIFTON, supra note 88, at 115 (describing how it is not uncommon for birth 
mothers to deny they are the right person when first contacted). "Taken by surprise, she 
needs time to work through her emotions before she is able to reopen this painful and 
often secret part of her life." [d. 
[d. 
120. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 70. The authors quote a birth mother as saying: 
I had an illegitimate child when I was nineteen. No one knew 
about it except my parents. Three years later I got married. 
My husband has no idea of my past nor will he be told. I now 
have a prestigious job, a child and a lovely home. I am thirty 
years of age. I'm afraid that if the child ever came to my front 
door it would be the end of my marriage. My husband would 
probably get custody of our child. 
121. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. 
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). 
122. [d. 
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child to his or her birth parents.12S Often, they interpret an 
adoptee's interest in his or her birth parents as an indication of 
their failure as parents.124 
The continuing enlightenment about adoption as a life long 
process will enable many adoptive parents to understand and 
overcome their traditional fears.12II The literature on the needs 
of adoptees regarding their genealogical identity explains to 
adoptive parents that an adoptee's interest in his or her biologi-
cal parents is not an indication of parental failure. 126 Further-
more, many adoptive parents find that their relationships with 
their adoptees improve after a reunion with the adoptees' bio-
logical parents.127 Once an adoptee can put aside his or her fan-
123. See, e.g., Terry Brick, Letters to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1990, at lOB 
(discussing how open records statutes would reduce adoptive parents to uncompensated 
foster parents). Brick, an adoptive parent, states: 
Jd. 
Jd. 
The decision to adopt is not one that a couple makes lightly 
and usually comes after years of trying to conceive a child of 
their own. Adoption is a way of filling those dreams one has 
for one's life; however, under [an open records statute] one 
would only fill those dreams for 18 years, then the "real par-
ent" comes back on the scene. Not a very happy prospect. Fre-
quent articles about adoptees finding birth parents never men-
tion the devastation this can bring to the adoptive parents 
who have spent a lifetime treating this child as their own, only 
to have it turn against them. 
124. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 73. 
125. Jd. at 15. The authors state: 
Parenthood (adoptive or biological) is a psychological phe-
nomenon based upon the growth of love and mutual respect 
between parent and child. . . . [T]he true "psychological par-
ent" is the mother or father who has nurtured the child during 
the developmental years. This relationship can never be seri-
ously endangered by outside persons or influences. If the 
adoptive parents can understand the primary importance of 
their role, ... they will not feel threatened by the implica-
tions of opening the sealed records. 
126. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text. 
127. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 16. Aigner states: 
[R]eunifications not only pose no ha2ard to adoptive families, 
they may instead strengthen the ties that bind. Reasons cited 
for this begin with the fact that an adoptive family is in place, 
grounded in shared experience, and has affections and a his-
tory that are not voided by a reunification anymore than a 
marriage. In addition, a search commonly prompts adoptees to 
contemplate, perhaps for the first time, the meaning of their 
familial relationships. Being found often has the same effect. 
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tasies about their biological parents, a greater sense of apprecia-
tion for adoptive parents is finally possible.u8 
Accepting the reality that their adopted children may feel 
compelled to search for their birth parents is difficult for adop-
tive parents. Nevertheless, an increasing number of adoptive 
parents now understand that if their adoptee wants to search for 
his or her birth parents, they should support this decision. 129 
Most adoptive parents realize they adopted because they wanted 
the chance to parent, not because they were promised 
confidentiality. ISO 
[d. 
Such contemplation commonly leads to a deeper appreciation 
of what there is to value. Finally, as adoptees finally put to 
rest the frequently disquieting questions of their heredity, why 
they were relinquished, and the like, the satisfactions they de-
rive from the answers tend to have beneficial consequences for 
all of their relationships. 
128. See AIGNER (Coming of Age), supra note 15, at 188. Aigner describes how the 
potential for an adoptee-birth parent reunification to strengthen an adoptive family is 
nowhere more fully illuminated than during occasions at search workshops when 
adoptees who have recently completed their quests tell of the ups and downs of their 
own adventures. Aigner states: 
[d. 
In these moments of highly charged sentimentality, a point is 
often reached in which adoptees will look to their adoptive 
parents and, in voices choking with emotion and with tears in 
their eyes, thank them for the affection, trust, and support 
shown during the search. In this exceptionally public setting, 
usually before a gathering comprised, for the most part, of 
strangers, these adoptees are avowing to their parents that, 
"When my need was great, you were there and I love you." 
For these adoptive parents, their share in the rewards of 
searching comes, in part, from knowing that life with their 
sons and daughters has been enriched by the experience. 
129. See, e.g., Bill Blanning, Unsealing the Past, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1983, at 
Section: Living. An adoptive father of four children states of adoptees, "They're not 
pieces of furniture. They have their own lives." The adoptive mother adds, "We feel they 
have a right to their heritage .... We're not threatened. Our relationship [with the son 
who found his mother] has not changed." [d. 
130. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 86. The authors quote an adoptive mother. as 
saying: 
I will not feel threatened or hurt if [the adoptee] should de-
cide to seek out his birth parents. When he became our son, 
we wanted no guarantees that he would accept us forever, with 
never a thought of the people who gave him life. We only 
wanted to love him and have the privilege of sustaining and 
nurturing that life. He has another "mother" somewhere, but I 
am his Mother. He will have no memories of her-she was not 
there to comfort him when he was sick . . . . She will not be 
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No doubt quite a few adoptive parents exist who clearly op-
pose open records and insist that they would not have adopted 
without the promise of confidentiality.181 Although this position 
is justifiable while the adoptee is a minor, the adoptee eventu-
ally grows up. Upon reaching majority, adoptive parents no 
longer have legal control over their adoptee. Thus, arguably, 
adoptive parents should not be able to control adult adoptees' 
access to this information. Moreover, if permanent confidential-
ity is the determinative factor in a potential parent's decision to 
adopt, the author posits the question whether these people 
should adopt in the first place. 182 
VI. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Current statutory approaches to the sealed records contro-
versy are inadequate in light of the changing views about se-
there for his first day of school or his graduation. Even if our 
son should some day meet his birth parents, why should I feel 
threatened? If he should become friends with them, or grow to 
love them, it would not diminish the relationship that we 
share with him. Love for one individual does not diminish be-
cause we also love another individual. If knowing and loving 
his birth parents would give our son more security and happi-
ness, we would welcome the opportunity for him. We love 
him-his happiness will make us happy. 
[d. at 80-81. See also Patty Lanoue Stearns, Mother, Where Are You? Adoptee's 17- Year 
Quest Brings Only Dead Ends, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 18, 1992, at 1D. Stearns 
quotes an adoptive mother regarding her daughter's search for her biological mother as 
saying, "I don't have any hard feelings .... She gave me something I couldn't have 
.... I'd like to meet [the biological mother] myself." [d. 
131. See SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 83. The authors quote an adoptive parent as 
saying: 
[d. 
If we had known that there was a possibility of the records 
being opened, we never would have adopted. We did not adopt 
our children to be caretakers or baby sitters for the natural 
mothers who gave them up for adoption. We adopted because 
we were granted total anonymity, and we feel that promise 
must be honored. 
132. Because adoption agencies attempt to procure the "best interests" of the 
adoptee in placing children with adoptive parents, the agencies extensively screen poten-
tial parents. If confidentiality is still consequential to adoptive parents after their 
adoptee reaches adulthood, the author suggests that the adoptive parents might be con-
sidering adoption mainly for self-seeking reasons rather than the adoptee's best interests. 
Thus, the author suggests that adoption agencies should hesitate to place children with 
these families simply because the adoption process can be quite difficult even when the 
focus is primarily on the best interests of the adoptee. 
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crecy.lSS Although most states provide for the release of non-
identifying informationlS4 on demand, inaccuracy and out-of-
date information continue to plague this process. lSII The statu-
tory provisions allowing adoptees access to identifying informa-
tion under special circumstances are inadequate as well. These 
"good cause" statutes fail to truly balance the competing inter-
ests involved.lsB Although some statutes have "mutual consent" 
provisions which can potentially relieve adoptees from demon-
strating good cause, these mechanisms also fail to address 
adoptees' needs. Many birth parents simply are not aware they 
can consent to the release of the original birth records. ls7 Where 
consent is refused, the states simply force adoptees to face the 
pitfalls of the "good cause" standard.lsB 
A. THE DEFICIENCIES OF "GOOD CAUSE" AND "CONSENT" 
STATUTES 
States have not consistently applied the "good cause" stan-
dard which adoptees must meet to obtain their original birth 
records. ls9 This standard fails to provide adoptees with guide-
lines as to what they must allege and prove to demonstrate the 
133. See supra notes 76·132 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 29 for a general list of non· identifying, background information 
kept by states. 
135. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13·16. Lack of diligence by investigators in ques· 
tioning biological parents, or their good faith failures to ask about certain conditions not 
generally known at the time to be a cause of concern (e.g., AIDS) contributes to this 
inaccuracy. Furthermore, biological parents may only have limited information about 
their own physical, psychological or genetic characteristics, or they may simply be reluc· 
tant to disclose what they do know about each other. [d. 
136. See, e.g., Arndt, supra note 39, at 120; Hanley, supra note 74, at 544; Sparks, 
supra note 10, at 589. 
137. See infra notes 148·149 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 33·38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the good 
cause standard. See infra notes 139·145 and accompanying test for a discussion of the 
inadequacies of this standard. 
139. Variations of the good cause statutes are found in many states. See, e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9·9·506(c) (Michie 1991) (good cause demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14·15·16 (Supp. 1993) (good cause shown by demonstrat· 
ing that disclosure will not result in any substantial harm to biological parent); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36·1 131(a) (Supp. 1993) (good cause requires a showing that it is in the 
best interest of the child or the public); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a·754 (West 1993) (good 
cause demonstrated by health or medical reasons); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9:437 (West 
1991) (good cause by a showing of compelling reasons); MINN. STAT. § 259.49(3) (West 
1992) (good cause established by a showing that disclosure would be of greater benefit 
than nondisclosure). 
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requisite necessity.140 Even where guidelines exist to aid a court 
in deciding whether the adoptee has demonstrated good cause, 
the court must still make a case-by-case determination. l4l How-
ever, courts cannot balance the real, present needs of adoptees 
against the theoretical needs of birth parents on a case-by-case 
basis.142 Because the biological parents will never stand before 
the court, the court must determine their desires conjectur-
ally.143 Courts will invariably presume that birth parents oppose 
disclosure.H4 Courts then typically decide that the adoptee's in-
terest is not as strong as that of the parents and therefore deny 
disclosure. Thus, the states' failure to ascertain the actual posi-
tion of birth parents prevents many adoptees from access to 
their records even though the birth parents would not object. l411 
"Mutual consent" statutes also fail to achieve an acceptable 
balance of interests. Although they eliminate the necessity of 
demonstrating good cause where a birth parent's consent is on 
file, the same inadequacies of "good cause" statutes exist with-
out this consent.HS Adoptees are forced to confront the inconsis-
tent and theoretical balance of a "good cause" determination 
that weighs heavily against them.147 Furthermore, because mu-
tual consent registries are generally not well publicized,H8 many 
birth parents are unaware they exist.H9 Thus, requiring their af-
140. Arndt, supra note 39, at 119; Carter, supra note 7, at 853. See also Paul J. 
Tartanella, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the 
Natural Parent, RUTGERS L. REV. 451. 477 (describing how evaluation of the adoptee's 
psychological problems presents practical difficulties beyond these interpretative incon-
sistencies). "Courts generally lack the knowledge necessary to determine the adoptee's 
psychiatric needs. Psychologists may be able to distinguish curiosity from true mental 
distress, yet, admitting such evidence invites a battle of the experts speculating on a 
subject about which the courts have very little expertise." Id. 
141. Hollinger, supra note 11, at 13-22 to 13-23. 
142. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 119. 
143. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Mich. App. 1982). 
144. See, e.g., id.; Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). 
145. Arndt, supra note 39, at 119. 
146. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text. 
147. Id. 
148. See, e.g., R. Bruce Dold, Adoption Registry Makes Tiny Splas/i, CHI. TRIll., 
Dec. 30, 1986, at Cl (discussing the ineffectiveness of the Illinois Adoption Registry). 
The registry had matched just one parent and child in its two years of existence. Dold 
states, "The registry has operated in virtual anonymity, with no budget for publicity and 
a state directive that limits the release of information." Id. 
149. Arndt, supra note 39, at 122. The mutual consent registries are passive in the 
sense that agencies are prohibited from assisting adoptees in actively searching for their 
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firmative action to register consent prevents possible consensual 
reunions from taking place. lllo Some birth parents may have re-
fused to give consent at the time of adoption but subsequently 
changed their minds. Nevertheless, mutual consent registries do 
not attempt to ascertain the wishes of these birth parents who 
have simply not come forth on their own initiative. 
Even the "search and consent" states cannot achieve a fair 
balance of interests. Search and consent statutes eliminate the 
defects of considering birth parents' interests conjecturallyllil 
and the inadequate publicity of mutual consent statutes.llll 
However, search and consent statutes cannot achieve a fair bal-
ance because they fail to weigh any interests at all. A birth par-
ent's refusal to consent effectively ends the court's inquiry,lII3 for 
the adoptee must then meet the good cause standard.lII4 Because 
the birth parent has actually communicated to the court a desire 
to remain anonymous, the adoptee's burden of establishing good 
cause will likely be even more difficult to sustain than in a sim-
ple "good cause" system.lllll Good cause is rarely found even in 
cases where no such refusal to consent is present, so presumably, 
a court will find good cause even less frequently in cases of pa-
rental refusal. 1116 
B. THE DOWNSIDE TO "OPEN RECORDS" STATUTES 
Adoption activists for greater disclosure advocate com-
birth parents. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Combined with the lack of 
publicity, such a passive system precludes many birth parents from learning the exis-
tence of a registry and their option to release their consent. Hollinger. supra note 11, at 
13-36. However, where adoptions have taken place since the enactment of these statutes, 
adoption agencies will likely have informed birth parents of this option. 
150. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 122 ("It is probable that many birth parents in 
these states do not realize that their silence may mean that their child will be prevented 
from seeing his records, and that they may not even be made aware of his wish to do 
so."). 
151. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.433(7) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that no infor-
mation in the sealed records will be disclosed if the birth parent objects for any reason). 
154. See, e.g., id. § 48.433(9). 
155. See Arndt, supra note 39, at 123 ("It can be assumed that [the) birth parents' 
refusal to consent will be given strong consideration by the court . . . . The adoptee is 
again faced with all the problems of the good cause system, and his case is even further 
weakened by this new factor."). 
156. [d. 
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pletely open records upon the adoptee's attainment of majority. 
Beyond the psychological and constitutional arguments they 
make,1II7 activists simply do not want judiciary involvement.1II8 
They view the possibility of adoption reunions as personal mat-
ters concerning only adult adoptees and their biological par-
ents.U19 Further, they point to the "open records" states and 
countries as an indication that allowing adoptees absolute access 
to their birth records is truly effective.16o 
While open records statutes would please adult adoptees 
who choose to search for their birth parents, these statutes suf-
fer the same balancing inadequacies as all the other statutes; 
they specifically fail to address the interests of birth parents 
who oppose disclosure. Open records make the interests of 
adoptees absolute while completely disregarding any adverse in-
terests of birth parents. Just as sealing records fails to take ac-
count of adult adoptees' interests, full disclosure wholly ignores 
the interests of birth parents who adamantly oppose revealing 
their identity. A truly fair birth records statute must at a mini-
mum give these birth parents some voice. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A birth records statute that sufficiently addresses the inter-
ests of all parties involved must balance these interests within 
the current social context. The statute should not presuppose 
that adoptees and biological parents are adversaries in this con-
troversy. Rather, an ideal statute would recognize that a sub-
stantial majority of members of the adoption process favor open-
ness, and only a small minority still desire state-imposed 
157. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitu-
tional challenges. See supra notes 88-105 for a discussion of the psychological evidence 
adoptees use in their attempt to establish "good cause" for accessing their original birth 
records. 
158. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 9 ("The search and reunification 
movement places a great deal of emphasis on the right of adopted adults to make key 
decisions affecting who they choose to regard as family."). 
159. See id. 
160. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 768 n.2 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J., 
concurring) ("I do not believe [Kansas' open records statute] would have endured this 
long.if its effect were to discourage adoptions."). See also Sachdev, supra note 89, at 149 
(stating that birth mothers cite the examples of Finland, Scotland, and Israel, where 
adoption is practiced effectively without confidentiality statutes). 
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secrecy. Activists for reform have gradually dispelled the tradi-
tional assumptions about the need for confidentiality in the 
adoption process,161 and studies indicate that greater openness 
would benefit all parties.162 Thus, the time is ripe for change. 
A. MICHIGAN'S CONSENT REGISTRY 
The author recommends that some form of a consent regis-
try should accompany any statutory change short of completely 
open records. Consent registries allow an adoptee or a biological 
parent to bypass any court proceedings where both their con-
sents are on file. 163 An ideal consent registry would model itself 
after the registry in Michigan. 164 Michigan employs a consent 
registry where biological parents take affirmative action only if 
they desire to remain anonymous.1611 Their failure to express a 
desire to retain confidentiality acts as an implicit consent to the 
release of identifying information. 166 
161. See supra notes 76-132 and accompanying text. 
162. See REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE, MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
supra note 111, at 3 ("The practice of sealing adoption records has ... contributed 
negatively to emotional and psychological health issues suffered by members of the triad. 
In general, 'openness' in adoption is a more sound approach .... "). See also REPORT TO 
THE CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 76, at 27 (recommending that adult 
adoptees should have access to their original birth certificate); SOROSKY, supra note 18, 
at 223 (stating that adult adoptees should have access to their birth records, if they so 
desire, when they reach the age of eighteen); TRISELIOTIS, supra note 91, at 166 (citing 
the recommendation of a task force report covering adopted adults in England, Wales, 
and Scotland which proposed that an adopted person age eighteen years or over should 
be entitled to a copy of his or her original birth certificate). 
163. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
164. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West 1993). 
165. See id. The statutory change requiring biological parents to act affirmatively if 
they want to prevent disclosure took effect in September of 1980: 
For all adoptions in which the biological parents' rights were 
terminated after September 12, 1980, an adoptee not less than 
18 years of age shall have the right to obtain the identifying 
information . . . and any additional information on file . . . 
except that if a biological parent has filed a statement cur-
rently in effect with the department denying consent to have 
identifying information released, identifying information shall 
not be released about that parent. 
[d. § 710.68(7). 
166. See id. Because biological parents must register a formal refusal to consent if 
they desire to protect their anonymity, their failure to register gives the state permission 
to release this information. Thus, Michigan's mutual consent registry shifts the advan-
tage of passivity to the adoptee by placing the burden of affirmative action on the biolog-
ical parent. Arndt, supra note 39, at 126. 
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Michigan's mutual consent registry is superior to those in 
other states because it creates a presumption in favor of open-
ness. Changing the procedure under which circumstances a bio-
logical parent must act affirmatively sends a clear message that 
consenting to the release of the original birth records is the ac-
cepted practice. IS? If Michigan's statistics are representative of 
the nation, employment of this type of registry will cause ap-
proximately eighty percent of biological parents to implicitly 
consent to the release of their identities upon the adoptee's 
reaching majority. ISS By not signing any form, biological parents 
would be subject to the statutory presumption that they have 
consented.ls9 Therefore, in most cases an adult adoptee will 
never need to petition a court for the release of these records. 
Nevertheless, a solution is still necessary for the situations 
where a refusal of consent is on file. 
Filing a denial of consent in Michigan acts as an absolute 
veto, for no information will be released about that parent. no 
The recommended solution would not allow the denial of a con-
sent to act as an absolute veto; rather, filing such a denial would 
simply reserve for a biological parent the right to be heard in a 
court proceeding before identifying information is released to an 
adoptee. Filing a statement denying consent would prohibit au-
tomatic disclosure of identifying information but would not bar 
the release of this information altogether. Where the biological 
parent has requested non-disclosure, states should establish 
guidelines for courts that will create easier access to the sealed 
records. 
B. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
A few commentators have suggested that the New Jersey 
167. See Hollinger supra note 18, at 13-38 (stating that requiring biological parents 
to act affirmatively shifts the adoption records policy in favor of disclosure). 
168. For children born and placed for adoption in Michigan since 1980, over eighty 
percent of the mothers and nearly seventy percent of the fathers have prospectively con-
sented to the release of their identities when the child reaches adulthood. These parents 
have either signed an explicit consent form or, by not signing any form, are subject to 
the statutory presumption that they have consented. Hollinger. supra note 18, at 86 
(Supp. 1992) (describing data provided by Michigan Dept. Soc. Serv., April 1991). 
169. See id. 
170. See supra note 165. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/9
1994] SEALED ADOPTION RECORDS 287 
court in Mills u. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Statisticsl7l struck 
an adequate statutory balance through its interpretation of the 
state's "good cause" standard.172 The Mills court upheld the 
constitutionality of New Jersey's "good cause" statute against a 
challenge by four adult adoptees.173 After stating that a court 
must look to the intent of a statutory law rather than simply to 
its form, the court established procedural guidelines to effect its 
interpretation of the state legislature's intent but more ade-
quately protect the rights of all parties.174 
The court held that while the adoptee is still a minor, the 
current procedure would remain the same so that the party 
seeking access has the heavy burden of demonstrating good 
cause.m However, where adult adoptees seek access to their 
original birth records, the burden shifts to the state to prove an 
absence of good cause.176 The court reasoned, "An adoptee who 
is moved to a court proceeding . . . is impelled by a need to 
know which is far deeper than 'mere curiosity.' "177 Further, the 
court suggested that because the state creates the adoptive rela-
tionship, it has a duty to assist adoptees in their growth to be-
come full and healthy members of society.178 
C. THE IMPROVIDENCE OF MILLS 
The author commends the Mills court for its attempt to 
maneuver around the inequities of the New Jersey "good cause" 
statute at a time when society was generally more accepting of 
secrecy. However, the Mills court did not go far enough. In prac-
tice, the Mills approach may not make it any easier for adult 
adoptees to learn the identities of their biological parents than 
171. 372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). 
172. See. e.g., Sparks, supra note 10, at 589-90; Allan, supra note 60, at 744; Arndt, 
supra note 39, at 125. 
173. Mills, 372 A.2d 646. 
174. [d. at 654. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. at 655. The court went on to state that this compelling psychological need 
may well constitute the good cause required by New Jersey's statute. 
178. See id. at 656. Hollinger has interpreted the Mills holding as essentially stat-
ing, "If the state wants to prevent adoptees from learning the names of their biological 
parents, it must bear the burden of showing why the petitioners' reasons are insufficient 
to satisfy the statutory good cause exception." Hollinger. supra note 11, at 13-26. 
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in jurisdictions where the initial burden of demonstrating good 
cause remains on adoptees. 179 If the state fails to show an ab-
sence of good cause, the Mills court would appoint an intermedi-
ary to locate the biological parents and solicit their consent. ISO 
Where consent is refused, the court must then weigh the 
adoptee's presumed justifications for disclosure against the bio-
logical parents' desire for privacy. lSI Thus, the court must per-
form the same type of balancing required where the burden is 
initially on the adoptee, and the procedure suffers the same in-
adequacies of the "search and consent" statutes. IS:! Because a bi-
ological parent could almost certainly maintain confidentiality 
simply by refusing consent, this approach tilts the balance too 
much in favor of secrecy. The shifting burden of proof employed 
by the Mills court simply does not accomplish a true presump-
tion in favor of openness. Thus, the Mills approach fails to actu-
ally establish a procedure that fairly addresses the competing 
interests. 
The inadequacies of the Mills approach aside, this decision 
also lacks precedential value. Eight years after Mills, a court in 
the same jurisdiction declined to follow this approach. In Backes 
v. Catholic Family and Community Services,183 a New Jersey 
court rejected the Mills interpretation of the state's "good 
cause" statute. The Backes court held that, as written, the New 
Jersey "good cause" statute requires adoptees to do more than 
merely file a complaint to establish good cause.184 Adoptees must 
demonstrate some need beyond desire or curiosity before a court 
should authorize contact with the biological parents. 1SII The Bac-
kes court concluded that a procedure such as suggested in Mills 
should come only from the legislature.188 
179. [d. 
180. Mills, 372 A.2d at 656. 
181. [d. 
182. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. 
183. 509 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). 
184. Backes, 509 A.2d at 300. 
185. [d. at 299. 
186. [d. at 294. 
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D. EXTENDING MILLS TO ACHIEVE A TRUE PRESUMPTION OF 
OPENNESS 
A true presumption in favor of open records would not per-
mit a refusal of consent to sustain a biological parent's burden of 
proof. Such a presumption would require biological parents 
themselves to demonstrat~ why their interest in confidentiality 
outweighs society's interest in disclosure. To protect their iden-
tities, biological parents necessarily would have to establish that 
their interests substantially outweigh the public policy in favor 
of openness.18? Biological parents could not sustain this burden 
of proof simply by showing that disclosure would cause them in-
convenience or emotional harm. Rather, courts would require 
truly compelling reasons so that anonymity would remain only 
in exceptional circumstances.188 Even where a biological parent 
sustained his or her burden of proof, every possible effort would 
be made to alleviate this strong desire for confidentiality so a 
court could still grant disclosure.189 
Although a perfect adoption records statute is impossible to 
achieve, states should attempt to find the best solution for the 
greatest number of people. Changing the presumption in favor 
of disclosure would achieve that goal. Were a statute to frame 
the sealed records dilemma in this way, it could finally relieve 
courts from the necessity of pitting adoptees against biological 
parents generally when determining whether to disclose these 
records. Such a statute would more accurately reflect the make-
up of the actual parties to this controversy: those in favor of 
candor, and those against it. 
187. The court proceeding would require that the biological parents be able to make 
an appearance through counsel in such a way as to protect their identities in the event 
that they sustained their burden of proof. 
188. The author believes that it is inappropriate to delineate what would amount to 
an "exceptional circumstance." Due to the factually intensive nature of such a court pro-
ceeding, each decision would require a case-by-case determination. Nevertheless, a show-
ing by a biological parent that the adoptee was the product of an extra-marital affair 
should probably sustain that biological parent's burden of proof. 
189. In the situation where the biological parent sustained his or her burden of 
proof because the adoptee was the product of an extra-marital affair, a court might still 
find a solution agreeable to that biological parent which would allow for disclosure. For 
instance, the court might fashion a way for the adoptee to meet with the biological par-
ent without the knowledge of that parent's spouse. 
31
Kuhns: Sealed Adoption Records
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
290 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:259 
E. BIOLOGICAL PARENTS SHOULD BENEFIT AS WELL 
This recommendation presupposes that an adult adoptee, 
not a biological parent, is attempting to open the birth records. 
Where a biological parent petitions a court for access to the 
sealed birth record of an adoptee, a strong case can be made 
that the burden of proving good cause should remain on the 
birth parent. The difference in treatment could be justified be-
cause the biological parents sign away their own legal rights at 
the time of adoption while adoptees do not. Unlike birth par-
ents, adoptees had no voice in the original adoption process. 
Their birth parents, adoptive parents, and the state made this 
decision for them. Regardless of any coercion some birth parents 
claim to have experienced that might have driven them to give 
up their child, the reality is that they did give the child away. 
Thus, one might view forcing adult adoptees to affirm a contract 
which they took no part in as unjust; yet arguably, the same 
logic does not apply to biological parents who agreed to anonym-
ity in the original proceeding. 
Although such an argument might be justified, the author 
recommends that biological parents should also benefit from the 
suggested procedural change establishing a presumption of 
openness. Because secrecy is the evil that this article attempts to 
combat, the author suggests that the presumption in favor of 
open records apply equally to biological parents and adoptees. 
Such a presumption would only occur once adoptees reach 
adulthood. Because adoptees maintain that they no longer need 
the state's protection as adults, they should accept the risk of 
being found as an incident to their individual autonomy. An 
adoptee who desires to remain anonymous could still attempt to 
establish that his or her interest in confidentiality substantially 
outweighs the public policy in favor of openness. If the adoptee 
is unsuccessful, opening the adoption records will only give bio-
logical parents identifying information. The adoptee can refuse 
to meet or maintain a relationship with a biological parent just 
as any other adult is free to choose with whom they associate. 
F. PROSPECTIVE CHANGE ONLY 
Drawing upon the experiences of adoption participants 
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helps demonstrate the changing views about secrecy and the 
need for legislative reform. However, this author does not pro-
pose that statutory change be applied retroactively. The litera-
ture suggests that a statute facilitating the opening of records 
retroactively would surely be in the best interests of most 
adoptees and biological parents. Nevertheless, an unyielding 
stance on this issue stands in the way of the necessary legislative 
reform. Irrespective of the benefits retroactive legislation would 
confer upon most, lobbyists cause state legislatures to shy away 
from such change due to the confidentiality which birth parents 
have supposedly been assured of in the past.190 State lobbyists 
insist that birth parents continue to rely on these promises,191 
and these lobbyists create the fear of potential lawsuits and un-
desirable emotional trauma.192 Thus, the author suggests that 
adoption reform activists concede this loss and concentrate on 
the attainment of prospective change. Prospective reform will at 
190. See Adoption Defense Fund Enters California Legislative Battle Over Privacy 
Rights For Women Who Have Placed Children For Adoption, Others Who Would Be 
Victimized By Rewriting Laws Meant To Protect Confidential Decisions, ADOPTION DE' 
FENSE FUND I, Aug. 10, 1990. The Adoption Defense Fund is a Washington, D.C. based 
national lobbying organization which is affiliated with the National Committee For 
Adoption. The Adoption Defense Fund issued a press release as a reaction to A.B. 3907. 
Reg. Sess., Cal. (1989·90) which would have opened sealed adoption records in California 
retroactively. The press release quotes William Pierce of the National Committee For 
Adoption as stating: 
Imagine what would happen if promises and guarantees made 
by any segment of our society were suddenly torn up by the 
California legislators. Consider the reaction if everyone who 
had confided in their lawyer, their physician, their psychia-
trist, their psychologist. their social worker, their clergy, or 
their mental health professional suddenly woke up one morn-
ing to find that California had retroactively opened up their 
sealed records to people they did not want to see them. 
[d. A.B. 3907 was not enacted. 
[d. 
191. See [d. at 2. But see LIFTON, supra note 88, at 264. Lifton states: 
A close look at the lobby groups [for sealed records] reveals 
that it is the conservative adoption agencies and the adoptive 
parents, not the birth mothers, who are struggling to keep the 
records closed. The adoption agencies are more afraid of losing 
their business, and adoptive parents of losing their children, 
than birth mothers are afraid of being found. 
192. See, e.g., Dold, supra note 148, at C1. Dold quotes Illinois State Representative 
John Cullerton as responding to the quest for open records by saying, "We don't want to 
get into that. It's too controversial. That used to be an incredibly emotional issue in 
Springfield." See also ADOPTION DEFENSE FUND, supra note 190, at 5 ("[Opening adop-
tion records retroactively would] stimulate a flood of litigation against the state, agen-
cies, attorneys and others who have had any role in past confidential adoptions."). 
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least secure greater openness in the future, and breaking down 
the walls of secrecy is the ultimate goal. 
For those adoption participants who will fail to profit under 
such a proposal, all is not lost. The inequities of today's sealed 
records statutes have induced adoption activist groups to be-
come adept at accessing identifying records despite this present 
legislation. Self-help organizations such as ALMAls3 currently 
teach many methods to facilitate the reunification searches of 
both adult adoptees and birth parents, thereby circumventing 
the need to petition the courts. IS. 
VIII. DISPELLING THE FEARS 
A. ADOPTION V. ABORTION 
Opponents of open records frequently argue that greater ac-
cess to adoption records will cause many birth mothers to abort 
a child rather than carry it to term and relinquish that child to 
the adoption process. lSII These opponents often characterize ac-
cess to adoption records as a pro-life versus pro-choice issue. lSG 
They believe that they are protecting adoptees because without 
confidentiality, adoptees might never live to protest sealed 
records at all. ls7 
Id. 
193. See supra note 23. 
194. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 67. Aigner states: 
[Tlhe movement organizations earn very high marks. They are 
staffed primarily by volunteers, by and large motivated simply 
by a desire to help. So far as search skills are concerned, they 
tend to run circles around private investigators. Their under-
standing of adoption, search and reunification is unrivaled. 
Time has shown most of these groups to be exemplary at the 
service they provide. 
195. See William L. Pierce, Letters to the Editor, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 
1986, at A8 ("[Bly failing to provide for a confidential adoption choice, many woman 
would in effect have no option except a confidential abortion."). See also Michael Drex-
ler, Adoptee Rights at Issue Push to Open Records Continues, PLAIN DEALER REPORTER, 
November 9, 1992, at lB. Dr. John C. Willke, past president of National Right to Life, 
headed an aggressive anti-abortion contingent that testified against an Ohio bill that 
would have allowed adult adoptees access to their original birth certificates because the 
group felt the bill promoted abortion. Id. 
196. Evidence of this view exists in bumper stickers which declare, "Adoption, Not 
Abortion." 
197. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 195. 
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Because adoption and abortion are both complex and emo-
tionally charged issues, linking the two together acts as a con-
venient method for open record opponents to discourage legisla-
tive reform. Nonetheless, in the determination of whether 
greater disclosure of adoption records is desirable, legislatur.es 
should not reduce adoption and abortion to alternative 
choices.le8 Some birth mothers dismiss the option of abortion 
immediately for religious, health, moral, or other reasons. lee 
Others struggle toward a resolution, but the ultimate decision by 
a birth mother to give up a child for adoption occurs after she 
has already ruled out abortion.20o Generally, when a birth 
mother walks into an adoption agency, she has already made the 
decision to continue her pregnancy.201 She is only trying to fig-
ure out whether to keep the child or place it in an adoptive 
home.202 
Although the threat of being found years later by their 
adoptee might act as a determining factor in the decision to 
abort for a few birth parents,20S such a decision remains within 
their legal rights.204 By reducing adoption and abortion to alter-
198. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 120 (1990). Caplan states, "To anoint 
adoption as the alternative to abortion is to link federal policy about the former with the 
almost fanatical politics surrounding the latter." 
199. A truly fair discussion of the motivating factors which drive a woman to abort 
or bear a child is beyond the scope of this article. 
200. This reasoning is based on the fact that a birth mother must first choose to 
bear a child before she can decide to relinquish the child to the adoption process. This 
decision to bear the child physically precludes the option of abortion. 
201. Michael Drexler, Abortion Foes Oppose Bill for Access to Adoption Records, 
PLAIN DEALER REPORTER, March 22, 1992, at 1A. Drexler quotes a social worker who 
states, "If they wanted an abortion, they would have already done it. We're not dealing 
with women who don't know that abortion is already an option." 
[d. 
202. [d. 
203. But see Arndt, supra note 39, at 115-16. Arndt states: 
[L]ogic also suggests that as many women might choose adop-
tion over abortion if they felt that they were not necessarily 
losing all contact forever with the child when they surrendered 
him. The existence of "open" adoption, where visitation by 
the natural parents is allowed after the adoption takes place, 
and the rising popularity of private adoptions, which allow the 
birth parents to choose the adoptive family for their child, 
suggest that some birth parents have chosen adoption over 
other alternatives when, and perhaps because, relinquishment 
of the child did not mean complete loss of contact. 
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (establishing a woman's constitu-
tional right to have an abortion). 
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native choices for a birth mother, open record opponents drag 
adoption participants into an entirely distinct controversy. An 
artificial link between adoption and abortion should not deny 
adult adoptees access to their original birth records. Thus, the 
author argues that the effect of sealed record laws is to unfairly 
protect the interests of unborn, putative adoptees against the 
needs of living adoptees for disclosure. 
B. OPENING PANDORA'S Box 
Opponents of open records fear that adoptees everywhere, 
armed with identifying information, will invade the lives of their 
biological parents.2011 These opponents commonly mention how 
adoptees will simply show up on the doorsteps of their biological 
parents and create a great disturbance in their lives.2oe Such 
fears are unwarranted for many reasons. First, greater access of 
adoption records will not cause all adoptees to search for their 
biological parents, for many adoptees are content to live with 
the mystery of their past.207 Secondly, many adoptees feel com-
pelled to search partially because they believe the sealed records 
statutes wrongly deny them the ability to make their own 
choice.208 Making the search more accessible could potentially 
lessen this urge. Third, adoptees who do decide to engage in a 
search are generally very considerate of their biological parents' 
feelings. 209 Most adoptees obtain some sort of counseling before 
205. See ADOPTION DEFENSE FUND, supra note 190, at 2. 
206. See id. ("[Many biological mothers] are terrorized by the prospect of their most 
intimate past lives being public knowledge. Their husbands, their children, their co-
workers, their neighbors-none of whom may know about an out-of-wedlock pregnancy 
years earlier, even decades earlier-may react unpredictably when the child shows up on 
their doorstep."). 
207. See David Keene Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act: Return to a Balanced 
View of Adoption, 19 FAM. L.Q. 141, 147 (1985) ("In those few jurisdictions where origi-
nal birth records are not sealed, inquiry concerning birth parents is made only about 3 
percent of the time. The most reliable estimates of frequency of searching in this country 
fall between 3 and 5 percent of the total adoptees."). See also TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91 
at 2 (stating that in Scotland, where adult adoptees are permitted access to their original 
birth certificates, only a small number of adoptees feel compelled to seek out this genea-
logical information). 
208. SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 156. See 'also TRISELIOTIS, supra note 91, at 55. 
Triseliotis finds generally that "adoptees who were given no information about their ori-
gins . . . were predominantly wanting to meet their natural parents. In contrast, those 
who were given 'some information in a positive and understanding way were mostly inter-
ested in additional particulars about their origins." [d. 
209. See TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91, at 44. Triseliotis states that in a study of 
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attempting contact,210 and nearly all adoptees proceed cau-
tiously due to their fear of rejection.211 Adoptees understand 
that their biological parents' lives will surely have changed and 
that a reunion will likely startle biological parents who probably 
have not had time to mentally prepare for such an encounter. 
Lastly, not all searching adoptees desire to maintain a close rela-
tionship with their biological parents.2l1l For most, ending the se-
crecy is the primary goal, and they are content simply to let the 
future run its own course. 
Opponents of greater disclosure also argue that opening 
records will devastate adoptees who reunite with their biological 
parents only to find that their concocted fantasies213 are inaccu-
rate.1l14 Some reunions will surely result in disappointment, but 
the success of a reunion cannot be measured by a lack of pain or 
suffering. Reunions are extremely emotional experiences' for 
adoptees and birth parents, and each one is unique; but all re-
unions are successful in that they provide adoptees that sense of 
identity or rootedness that was previously missing in their 
lives.ll16 Even if adoptees are disappointed by what they find, 
they can at least put an end to their fantasies and get on with 
adoptees who were searching for their birth parents there was no evidence of any abuse 
. or harassment of biological parents by adoptees who found their biological parents. [d. 
"The various studies carried out so far suggest that the vast majority of adoptees act 
thoughtfully and with great consideration for the feelings of both their birth and adop-
tive parents." [d. at 51. 
2lO. See AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23, at 15. 
211. See Dear Abby, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1993, at EI0. An adoptee states, "there's 
someone missing, someone I'm afraid to look for, because if I find her, she may reject me 
again." [d. 
212. See TRISELIOTIS. supra note 91, at 15 (discussing a study of adoptees in Scot-
land where access to original birth certificates is available to adult adoptees). Of the 
seventy adoptees in the study, only sixty percent desired to even meet their biological 
parents. The rest were content to simply have more information about their sociological 
and biological background. 
213. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 123 (stating that adoptees fantasi2e 
about who their birth parents are, where they are, how they look, what kind of family 
and work life they have, and why they gave the adoptee up). 
214. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, supra note 110, at 8. 
215. See REPORT OF THE ADOPTION TASK FORCE, MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
supra note 111, at 3. Each member of the adoption triad carries a perception of the other 
members varying from fantasy to reality. The degree of acceptance of and comfort with 
one's identity in relation to other members of the triad is often dependent upon one's 
having access to information about and opportunity to come to terms with one's past, 
present and future. [d. 
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the rest of their lives.216 
IX. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the history behind today's sealed records 
statutes reminds us that adoptees' original birth records were 
not always sealed.217 Permanent confidentiality became the 
norm in the 1940's mainly in response to societal attitudes to-
ward illegitimacy. us Sealed records laws may have served an im-
portant purpose when society frowned upon unwed mothers and 
their "illegitimate" children, but times have changed. Adoption 
participants have vocalized that permanent state-imposed confi-
dentiality no longer serves their needs,u9 and various studies 
have borne out this truth.220 
By permanently sealing original birth records, states inap-
propriately tell adoption participants that biological ties are in-
significant. Maybe state legislatures fear the worst possible con-
sequences of greater openness, or possibly they feel this 
216. See, e.g., SOROSKY, supra note 18, at 168. The authors quote an adoptee whose 
biological mother wrote her one letter after receiving an initial phone call: 
After that letter, she refused to answer my letters, and I fi-
nally stopped writing. I still hope that someday she will 
change her mind and feel more comfortable meeting me and 
letting me know her and her family. In thinking this over, I 
have to say that although I was still confused, I was also re-
lieved that my search was over. I could at last lay my fantasies 
to rest. I knew who I looked like, where my talents came from 
and who my ancestors were. I realized too that for the first 
time in my life I had come into contact with a blood relative. I 
found that immensely satisfying, as if this somehow bound me 
more to the physical world. 
Id. See also LIFTON, supra note 88, at 29. Lifton states that adoptees share the fantasy of 
royal blood along with non-adoptees, but adoptees also have negative fantasies-of 
whores, rapists, murderers: 
Id. 
[T]he possibilities are limitless. Back and forth they go be-
tween them, polarizing the good and the bad as it suits their 
psychological need. But unlike the nonadopted who can even-
tually resolve their family romance by unifying the good and 
bad parents into the one set they have, there is no way for the 
Adoptee to resolve the polarization short of knowing about the 
birth parents as real people. 
217. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 76-132 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra note 162. 
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controversy is of less moment than other pressing social issues. 
Nevertheless, even with states' current policy of secrecy, there is 
no guarantee that biological parents or their adoptees will retain 
their anonymity. Not only have self-help search organizations 
become adept at assisting adoption members in locating their bi-
ological relatives, but a market has arisen for private investiga-
tors due to the profit they can make searching. Several legal 
methods exist to maneuver around the sealed records statutes,1l1ll 
and some searchers use illegal tactics as well.222 The fact that 
people are willing to break the law to get around the sealed 
records statutes lays testament to the compelling need many feel 
for this information. When people feel driven to disobey what 
they perceive to be an inequitable law, perhaps society should 
question the morality of the law, not the morality of the actual 
law breaker. 
History has demonstrated from time to time that unjust 
laws subsist. Government often responds lethargically to the 
need for legislative reform because it fears the unknown. The 
continued existence of sealed adoption records statutes in the 
face of needed reform is symptomatic of this fear; however, as 
adoption participants place increasing pressure on their state 
legislatures, states will finally be forced to address their needs. 
The fear of openness by a minority of adoption participants no 
longer warrants statutory protection. The personal experiences 
of adoption participants demonstrate the propriety of greater 
openness in the adoption process, and after all, no one is in a 
better position to determine what is best for these participants 
than adoptees, biological parents, and adoptive parents 
themselves. 
221. See generally AIGNER (Faint Trails), supra note 23. 
222. See 60 Minutes: Who Am I? (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1994). This seg-
ment centers around Sandy Musser, a woman who started her own search and reunifica-
tion business. Musser was sentenced to four months in federal prison after being con-
victed of fraud, conspiracy and theft of government property. Musser's conviction 
stemmed from her employment of a woman who impersonated government officers in 
order to obtain identifying information from sealed adoption records. Musser believes 
sealed records laws are immoral and considers her conduct a form of civil disobedience. 
Id. 
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